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Replaces mutable tag/branch references with immutable SHA hashes to prevent supply chain attacks (ref: TeamPCP/Trivy March 2026). Actions left as tags: 0
Up to standards ✅🟢 Issues
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Pull Request Overview
This PR successfully addresses the security objective of pinning GitHub Actions to immutable SHA hashes to prevent supply chain attacks. Codacy analysis indicates that the changes are up to standards, with no new issues, complexity increases, or duplication. However, the review identified a need for verification: it must be confirmed that the specific hashes used correspond to the intended 'v4' versions of the actions. Additionally, the updated workflows should be executed to ensure no regressions were introduced by the pinning.
About this PR
- Verify that the provided SHA hashes correspond accurately to the 'v4' release of the respective GitHub Actions. Using unverified hashes risks pinning to incorrect versions or untrusted commits.
Test suggestions
- Verify that the specified SHA hashes correctly resolve to the intended action versions (v4)
- Execute the updated CI and Publish workflows to ensure no breakage after pinning
Prompt proposal for missing tests
Consider implementing these tests if applicable:
1. Verify that the specified SHA hashes correctly resolve to the intended action versions (v4)
2. Execute the updated CI and Publish workflows to ensure no breakage after pinning
🗒️ Improve review quality by adding custom instructions
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Pins all GitHub Actions from mutable tags/branches to immutable SHA hashes.
This prevents supply chain attacks like the TeamPCP/Trivy incident (March 2026), where attackers force-pushed tags to point at malicious commits.
Auto-generated by the Codacy security audit script.